
PRIMARY SOURCES FOR EDUCATORS AND STUDENTS

Cuban Missile Crisis—Strategic Consideration, October 1962



Citation: Excerpts from Document 46, "CIA Memorandum, Probably Soviet MRBM Sites in Cuba, 16 October 1962," in Central Intelligence Agency, CIA documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, editor, Mary S. McAuliffe, [1992], Federal Documents Microfiche, PREX 3.2:M 69, Library of Virginia.

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PSALM 70P SECRET ANNEX: Strategic Considerations 1. In weighing their decision to install ballistic missiles in Cubs, the Soviet leaders must have considered the military utility of these weapons with and without nuclear warheads, the targets in the US and elsewhere which they could reach, and the strategic value of deploying missile forces of various sizes in Cuba. 2. Because of their type of guidance and relative inaccuracy, ballistic missiles have utility against fixed targets of known location, and not against such targets as convoys or naval forces at sea. The Soviet 700 and 1,000 n.m. missiles, whose CEP's are estimated to be in the 1 to 1.5 n.m. range, could conceivably be employed with HE warheads against large military contors and urban areas. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would see any advantage in deployment for this purpose, but they might regard this threat as contribution to the deterrence of Latin American support for HS or Cuban refuses overse of Latin American support for US or Cuban refugee operations against the Castro regime, Deployed 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles with nuclear warhoads would augment Soviet strategic striking power by virtue of their ability to reach a number of American targets with warheads having yields which are not significantly smaller than those of current Soviet ICEMs. From the present base area in Cuba, 700 n.m. missiles with nuclear warheads could reach eastern US targets within an arc including Savannah and New Orleans, including 7 SAC bomber and tanker bases and at least one important naval base. (The 350 n.m missiles could reach bomber bases in Florida, of which there are only two.) The 1,100 n.m. missile would threaten a much more significant number of critical military targets, including 18 SAC bomber and tanker bases. tary targets, including 18 SAC bomber and tanker bases, an ICBM base, and three major naval bases. In addition, such targets as the Panama Canal and US bases as far east as Puerto Rico could be reached. Both of these missiles have ranges sufficient to reach many US population, in-dustrial and administrative center-including, in the case of the 1,100 n.m. missile, Washington, D.C. Installations of importance to the US atomic energy and space programs also would be within range of Cuban-based 700 and 1,100

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