PRIMARY SOURCES FOR EDUCATORS AND STUDENTS

Excerpt from The Federalist Papers, Number 10, 1787 (p. 1 of 2)

THE FEDERALIST.

57.

The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controling.

its effects.

It a faction confifts of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its finister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the fociety; but it will be unable to execute and mafle its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to facrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great defideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has fo long labored, and be recommended to the effeem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently, by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number, and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied one as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their esseasy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their esseasy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society, consilling

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Excerpt from The Federalist Papers, Number 10, 1787 (p. 2 of 2)

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confishing of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to facrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with perfonal fecurity, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths .-Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equallized and affimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to facrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen

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